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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCTs) programs are increasingly becoming the new 
face of poverty reduction in the global South. Often called a magic bullet, the most 
common goals of a CCT is to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. These 
programs transfer cash to families in extreme impoverishment provided they comply with 
pre-determined conditions. These conditions usually involve school attendance for 
children and health check-ups. By linking cash to nutrition, health, and education, CCTs 
aim to increase the human capital of the poor. It is through this accumulation of human 
capital that enables them to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. 
However, many CCTs have been unable to demonstrate significant reductions of 
poverty in a long-term, sustainable manner. Why is this so? In this thesis, I argue that the 
macroeconomic policies influence the design and implementation of conditional cash 
transfer programs. Using Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades, the first CCT of its kind, as 
my case study, presents a unique opportunity to examine this relationship. Mexico has 
faced deepening neoliberal reforms since the 1980s that continue to this day, while 
Progresa-Oportunidades has remained the principle poverty reduction strategy. 
Nevertheless, poverty levels in Mexico continue to grow. I argue that the suite of policy 
regimes associated with neoliberal macroeconomic planning have adversely affected the 
objectives, implementation, and outcomes of the Progresa-Oportunidades program. 
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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs—cash transfers to the poor by the 
national government with formal conditionalities, such as child school attendance, 
attached to them-- have become a significant mechanism in national poverty reduction 
programs (PRPs) in the global South. But it is in Latin America that they have become 
one of the main social service programs used to combat poverty. In 2010 there were 
eighteen CCT programs operational throughout Latin America and Caribbean countries. 
These CCT programs have varying goals depending on what the government sees at the 
most pressing issue. For the purpose of this thesis, I will be examining the Mexican CCT 
program Progresa-Oportunidades (PROP)1. Specifically, my research will focus on how 
the program’s structure and effectiveness has evolved from 1997-2012 as a consequence 
of the federal government's neoliberal economic and social policies. The sexenios (the 
presidential term of office) being examined are those of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon 
(1994-2000), Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-2006), and Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006-
2012).  
Progresa-Oportunidades is being examined since it is the first CCT of its kind to 
incorporate education, nutrition, and health within one integrated program. Many other 
                                                          
1 The program Progresa-Oportunidades has been re-branded two times since its creation in 1997. In 1997 it 
was launched under the name PROGRESA, Programa de Eduación, Salud, y Alimentación. In 2002 it was 
renamed Programa de Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades, or simply Oportunidades until 2013, when the 
Peña Nieto administration changed its name to PROSPERA Programa de Inclusión Social. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the program will be referred to as Progresa-Oportunidades or PROP. 
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CCT programs throughout Latin American are based on the Mexican model because of its 
innovation and as it has been reviewed by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) since its implementation. As a result of this early reviewing process, the 
program was able to adjust accordingly to address certain limitations.  
PROP was launched in 1997 as the main poverty alleviation strategy of the Zedillo 
government. Ernesto Zedillo wished to distance himself from the Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari administration, who had caused considerable damage the Mexican economy and 
beyond, specifically through drastic neoliberal reforms. Zedillo inherited a government 
and country that was on the verge of crisis shortly after the signing of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, as well as facing increasing levels of poverty 
and an indigenous uprising of the Zapatistas in Chiapas. As well, the federal elections 
which Zedillo won were heavily contested and the introduction of a poverty alleviation 
program was also seen as a way to legitimize his government (Yaschine & Orozco, 
2010:62).  
In 2000, Vicente Fox won the presidential election and was the first non-PRI 
president in over 70 years. In an unusual move for Mexican politics, Fox did not throw 
out all the social programs of the previous administration, which is the norm every time 
there is a new sexenio (Yaschine & Orozco, 2010:67). Fox continued the PROP social 
program and re-branded it in 2002 under the name Programa de Desarrollo Humano 
Oportunidades, or simply Oportunidades. The re-branding went further than superficial 
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changes and many new policies were introduced, such as a greater emphasis on the 
educational component of the program  
In 2006 Felipe Calderon took charge of the federal government and continued the 
neoliberal reforms of his predecessors. Faced with the 2008 world recession, Calderon 
focused on increasing deregulation and labour flexibility (Tetreault, 2012:58). Poverty 
levels began to increase once more from 2006-2012 as social programs became a lesser 
priority. The economic and social policies of the Zedillo, Fox, and Calderon 
administration, outlined above, will be examined in this thesis. The aim is to analyze how 
these respective policies have negatively impacted the effectiveness of the Progresa-
Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program. 
I will focus my research into the evolution of Mexican CCT programs with the research 
question:  
How and to what extent have the neoliberal social and economic policies of the 
Mexican federal government affected the conditional cash transfer program Progresa-
Oportunidades from 1997-2012?  
 
Methodology 
I have not carried out any primary data acquisition, but have relied on a broad 
spectrum of secondary sources for my data. These sources have included: Secretary of 
Social Development (SEDESOL) PROP external evaluation reports, National Council for 
the Evaluation of Social Development Policies (CONEVAL) PROP Evaluation reports 
and Social Policy Evaluations, and Secretary of Inland Revenue and Public Credit 
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(SHCP) budgetary break downs from 2001-2012 for the Secretary of Education (SEP), 
Secretary of  Health (SALUD), and SEDESOL. 
I also used information from multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) reports on CCTS and Social 
Services; World Health Organization (WHO) reports on health care in the developing 
world; CEPAL and Inter-American Development Bank investigations on CCTs; and 
World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistical data mainly 
pertaining to GDP growth and poverty rates. 
Primary source material was also obtained from the studies of other scholars, such 
as: Adato and Hoddinott, Banegas-Gonzalez, Boltivinik, Fiszbein, Hanlon et al, Medrano, 
Tetrault, and Valencia. 
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured as follows: Section II of this thesis will provide a review 
of literature and the central issues relevant to my research. Beginning with social services 
and development, the debates being explored include the benefits of privatizing social 
services versus retaining social services as a public good. The role of the state and its 
effectiveness in providing for its population is a common theme in relation to this topic. 
This is debated by scholars such as Lawrence Martin and Christine Ludowise who cite the 
benefits of privatization, and by Santosh Mehrotra and Enrique Delamonica who argue 
for universal social service provision. Next, CCT programs are examined. They key 
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issues raised by Hanlon et al, as well as Jishnu Das et al, revolve around whether cash 
transfers should be conditional or unconditional, and the possible impacts conditionality 
has on participants. These authors also argue in favour of cash in comparison to in-kind 
food transfers and other subsidies. Cash is cited as more efficient and less expensive than 
traditional subsidies.  
We will then move on to discuss conditional cash transfer programs in Latin 
America. Hanlon et al and Laura Rawlings present CCTs as a global South response to 
traditional northern aid agencies and say the idea is “revolutionary”. In contrast, many 
Latin American authors such as Julio Boltvinik, Anahely Medrano, Carlos Barba, and 
Jose Pablo Bentura claim that CCT programs are purely a continuation of pre-existing 
neoliberal policies present in Latin America. As well, the role that economic growth plays 
in poverty reduction and in CCT programs is explored by Cindy Clavo and Nora Lustig.  
Finally, we will discuss the current debate surrounding the central issues 
connected with the Mexican conditional cash transfer program Progresa-Oportunidades. 
This section begins with a brief overview of Mexican social services starting from the 
1970s and providing context for the emergence of PROP. I will continue by discussing 
the debates centred on the quality of service provision within PROP as well as the role the 
program has played in the reduction of poverty in Mexico.  
Section III, the empirical section of the thesis, will provide data in relation to each 
of the topics in the literature review. Data obtained from federal governments, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations Research Institute 
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for Social Development (UNRSID), among others, will be used to highlight budget costs 
of social services in various countries worldwide. Information and statistics relating to 
conditional cash transfers programs and conditional cash transfers in Latin America will 
be collected via federal government budgets, World Bank databases, United Nations 
Development Reports, as well as scholars and independent studies that have collected 
information in relation to this topic.  
Information about Mexican macroeconomic policy from 1980-2012 will be 
provided, followed by Mexican social policy in the same time period. For the purpose of 
this thesis, only macroeconomic policies are being investigated. Next will be general 
background data and statistics on Mexico to introduce the reader to the social context of 
PROP. Empirical information in relation to the PROP program will be obtained via 
CONEVAL, SEDESOL and scholarly evaluations of the program, such as Banegas-
Gonzalez and Tetreault.  
Section IV will present an analysis and discussion of the core issues presented in 
the literature review with respect to the data presented in Section III. It will show the 
limitations of the Progresa-Oportunidades program in relation to the neoliberal social 
and economic policies of the Mexican federal government. Citing reduced expenditure in 
basic social services, and the neglect of rural institutions, I will prove that these 
macroeconomic policies are impeding the effectiveness of the CCT program.  
Section V will conclude the work of this thesis. I will begin by outline the findings 
from the empirical data section and the analysis. I will then summarize the importance of 
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analyzing CCT programs in the broader context of a countries macroeconomic policy, 
and policy recommendations will be made based on the findings. At the end of this 
section an extensive bibliography is provided.  
 
Thesis Statement 
My argument in this thesis will be that the suite of policy regimes associated with 
neoliberal macroeconomic planning have adversely affected the objectives, 












A Review of the Literature 
 
1. Social Service Programs and Development 
Many scholars and prominent world organizations acknowledge the role social 
services play in the alleviation of poverty. According to the United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), social services “[…] increase the chances 
that individuals and their families can lift themselves out of poverty and live dignified and 
productive lives” (UNRISD, 2010:161). UNRISD also states that poverty can be 
perceived as the result of the non-attainment of basic capabilities arising in part from the 
absence of social services.  As well, access to education and health care is a fundamental 
right enshrined in various UN declarations. Universal access to these services is 
considered a vital tool for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Yet, social services incorporate many different types of supports and programs. Elizabeth 
Wickenden (1976) concedes that there is difficulty in finding a common understanding of 
what social services incorporate. Social services can be understood broadly as all people 
orientated services and benefits. They can also be restricted to specific services such as 
pensions, unemployment insurance, or education.  For the purpose of this thesis, basic 
social services are understood as education and health care. 
9 
 
Nevertheless, while organizations have universally agreed upon the basic social 
services, there is debate regarding how to implement these services. These services may 
be either as marketable good via privatization or as a public good run by the state.  
The Thatcher and Reagan administrations signalled the beginning of wide 
sweeping privatization in the global South. One of the results of this new policy change 
was the commercialization of basic social services. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) states that privatization and other structural reforms implemented in developing 
countries promote economic efficiency and growth.  Many developing countries were 
pressured by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank (WB) to implement these neoliberal policies. This is because state 
enterprises in the global South are often overstaffed overpaid and unproductive. As a 
result, these enterprises drain government budgets and slow overall economic growth 
(IMF, 1999:3).  These policy changes were made as part of the conditions in a structural 
adjustment program in order to qualify for development assistance loans and debt relief 
(Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005:3). 
The IMF also argues that the poor have better access to goods and services, such 
as food and basic social services, if market forces are allowed to determine prices (IMF, 
1999:23). As well, researchers state that the commercialization of social services through 
contracts and outsourcing can act as a mechanism to protect individual rights, raise 
efficiency and promote accountability to the public (Ludowise, 2004:2).  
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The main focus of federal governments, such thinkers maintain, should therefore 
be on the creation of new public-private partnerships. Martin (2004) asserts that the 
problems of implementing social services are too complex for governments to address (p. 
177).  The privatization of social services aids in the reduction of costs, as Etzioni (2011) 
estimates that by 2030, entitlements in the United States will consume 70% of the federal 
budget. This demonstrates how privatizing social services can have a huge impact on the 
reduction of debt and state spending. It also aids in the improvement of the quality of the 
services as well as addressing any underserved populations (Martin, 2004: 7).  
However, Etzioni continues by saying that increasing the budget instead of re-
dividing existing money would allow for the choice and not the obligation to cut social 
services (p. 110). He states that the US government alone loses almost one trillion dollars 
every year from tax loopholes. Many of these losses are incurred by giveaways to special 
interests groups and persons. Etzioni recommends tax reform, not only to raise the taxes 
of the rich but also to address these major discrepancies in the law (pp. 110-111). 
 UNRISD argues that social service systems that are fragmented with multiple 
programs and providers tend to have higher costs, lower levels of redistribution, and 
limited access for the poor. This last idea is elaborated by explaining how the widespread 
commercialization of social services beginning in the 1980s destabilized much of the 
previous advances towards universal access in many regions of the world. Such 
privatization and destabilization subsequently contributed to rising costs, in particular for 
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the poor and vulnerable populations, and greater inequality and exclusion (UNRISD, 
2010: 161).  
Mehrotra and Delamonica (2005) state that developing countries should not have 
wide spread privatization of social services. Their reasoning includes the idea that the 
majority of developing countries’ populations are still not covered under the most basic of 
health care and educational services. Commercialization would, therefore, neglect these 
vulnerable populations and deny them further care (p. 3).   
Ul-Haq (1996) maintains that the provision of basic social services are vital for the 
reduction of poverty and the creation of a stable state (pp. 2-3). It is only by accessing 
social services that individuals can increase their economic opportunity and achieve 
gainful employment. Consequently, if these opportunities are denied to impoverished 
groups they will be denied social mobility. An example of the social services that ul-Haq 
discusses is income transfers. Income transfers can take many forms, however this thesis 
will be examining the social service programs which are built around conditional cash 
transfers. 
 
2. Conditional Cash Transfers and Development  
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) are praised by various international 
organizations and scholars as the greatest innovation in development policy of the past 
decade (Adato & Hoddinott, 2010: 4). CCTs are unique social service programs as they 
link social safety nets directly to human capital by investing in basic social services 
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(Slater, 2008: 11). CCTs are considered to have three main characteristics which contrast 
with traditional supply side social service provision: Firstly, conditional cash transfers are 
targeted interventions to the poorest of households instead of broad or universal 
participation; secondly, beneficiaries are provided cash which is usually given directly to 
the mother; thirdly, in order to receive the transfer families must comply with certain 
predetermined conditions, the most common being enrolling children in school and health 
clinic attendance (Adato & Hoddinott, 2007: 1).  
There is much debate about the role conditional cash transfers play in the 
reduction of poverty. In countries where CCTs are implemented, poverty is often 
understood as an intergenerational issue (Hanlon et al. 2010). Children in poor families 
tend to have lower levels of education and poorer health. This translates into fewer 
economic opportunities, which results in their children becoming poor as well.  One of 
the biggest arguments in favour of CCTs notes that by incorporating conditions such as 
school enrollment and health clinic attendance, it allows families to break this 
intergenerational cycle of poverty (Hanlon et al. 2010).  
The advocates for conditionality elaborate this idea by citing the role conditional 
cash transfers play in the accumulation of human capital. The main theoretical premise 
behind human capital is that with better health and education, families will begin breaking 
the intergenerational cycle of poverty by increasing their productivity in the labour 
market (Hanlon et al. 2010). The World Bank states that in developing countries, parent’s 
investment in their children’s human capital is too low, thus perpetuating the cycle of 
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poverty. This aids in the World Bank’s justification of the conditionality of the money, 
citing the role conditions play in augmenting impoverished families’ investment in human 
capital. 
Imposing conditions not only allows for greater investment in human capital, it 
also makes programs more politically acceptable. Greater support for CCTs is gathered 
by presenting the program not as a handout but rather as a social contract (Das et al. 2005; 
Hanlon et al. 2010). Advancing the program as a social contract reflects a negative social 
opinion of the poor; that the impoverished are partly to blame for their circumstances and 
therefore must be told how to escape their poverty (Slater, 2008). This opinion however is 
much more politically viable, as agencies, governments, and voters are more reluctant to 
simply give a hand out and relinquish total control.   
Das et al. (2005) continue this argument by stating how supporters of conditions in 
CCTs indicate the ability conditionality has to alter behaviour. When an individuals’ 
actions do not conform to societal preference, such as turning to crime, CCTs can be used 
as an incentive to change anti-social behaviours and to protect individuals from their own 
irrationalities. Sala-I-Martin (1997) elaborates by saying that CCTs “[…] are a way to 
bribe poor people out of activities that are socially harmful, such as crimes, revolutions, 
riots, and other forms of social disruptions” (p. 83). Conditional cash transfer programs 
can thus be seen as a tool to maintain social order and to make the poor conform to 
societal norms.  
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However, some scholars argue for the transfers to be unconditional. Skoufias 
(2005) states that simple economic theory describes how households would be better off 
by receiving the money unconditionally. This is because the imposed conditions force the 
households to make decisions that are different from those they would make if they were 
able to use the money at their own discretion (p.  17)  
Other authors, such as Hanlon et al. (2010) assert that the poor are capable of 
properly investing their money without an external body dictating how it should be done. 
The conditions placed upon impoverished participants are activities that they want to 
participate in however they lack the necessary financial resources. The authors continue 
by adding that families with restricted income use the extra money wisely and creatively 
without the instruction of external bodies (p. 130).   
Nevertheless, there is limited evidence to support the idea that the conditions 
themselves are the reason for positive health and educational outcomes (Slater, 2008). 
Moreover, Slater states that income predictability may be just as, if not more important 
than, conditionality. Unfortunately there have been no intensive studies to validate this 
hypothesis. This leads into the next big issues surrounding conditional cash transfer 
programs, the question of providing cash instead of in-kind transfers like food aid. 
Cash, in comparison to in-kind food transfers, has been credited for being more 
efficient and creating savings in terms of reduced logistical costs. In addition, cash also 
avoids negatively impacting local food production (Slater, 2008). Monetary transfers aid 
in the stimulation of the local economy, as households participating in CCT programs 
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have been shown to spend their money locally on food, clothing, and other inputs (Hanlon 
et al 2010). This subsequently creates an upward spiral of economic growth in the 
locality. 
Monetary transfers are also acknowledged as being less expensive compared to 
other forms of social programs (Adato & Hoddinott, 2007), and CCTs reduce bureaucracy 
by giving the money directly to the family instead of through intermediary organizations 
(Hanlon et al. 2010). Also, many governments in developing countries spend more on 
programs directed at the non-poor, such as energy subsidies. In comparison, their 
spending is dramatically smaller on poverty reduction programs, which demonstrates that 
low income countries are able to afford conditional cash transfer programs.   
As a rebuttal to this point, Slater (2008) argues that much of the data used to 
analyze the budget of cash transfer programs does not include additional complementary 
costs. These complementary costs include investments in educational and health care 
centres, markets, roads, and other infrastructure needed to improve the effectiveness of 
CCT programs. It is important to invest in these areas because CCT programs will have 
limited success and possible negative effects, such as higher food prices, if other 
government support programs are not in place. Adato and Hoddinott (2007) address this 
concern by distinguishing between the difference of initial start-up costs and the fixed 
costs once the program has been established. Significant investment is needed in other 
sectors during the launch of the program, but the longer the program is in place, the more 
efficient it becomes.  
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3. Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America 
Brazil and Mexico are considered the leaders of conditional cash transfer 
programs in Latin America and the world. Each country exhibits a significant shift from 
traditional poverty reduction efforts by using a demand side transfer in addition to the 
simultaneous incorporation of health, nutrition, and education services. Four main trends 
are attributed to this shift in international development thinking which spurred the 
creation of conditional cash transfer programs (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013:2-3): Firstly, Latin 
America suffered economic stagnation  during the 1980s and 1990s that resulted in 
increased levels of poverty and labour informality which left large portions of the 
population unprotected by traditional social insurance schemes;  secondly, the revived 
economic growth in the 2000s permitted greater government spending on social 
assistance programs; thirdly, with the increased social spending, a shift in economic 
thinking orientated governments towards ‘pro-poor’ growth; lastly, the political economy 
of CCT programs contributed to securing support from politicians and voters (Paes-Sousa 
et al. 2013:2-3). These trends influenced how CCTs were designed contributed to the 
success of many of these programs.  
A key attribution of CCTs is the evaluation and impact reports built into the 
program. The evaluations monitor many aspects of the programs, most notably being 
program efficiency, targeting, and resource allocation.  For example, the Mexican 
program Progresa-Oportunidades has external evaluations conducted by the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), which began analyzing the program as soon as it 
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was implemented (Yaschine and Orozco, 2010:66). After witnessing the initial success of 
the Mexican and later Brazilian CCTs and the positive reviews by external agencies, 
many other Latin American nations initiated their own programs. Consequently, 
conditional cash transfer programs have gradually been replacing traditional in-kind 
transfers such as food aid, price, and consumption subsidies (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). As 
of 2010 there were eighteen CCT programs operational throughout the Latin American 
and Caribbean region, covering an estimated 24% of the region’s population (Paes-Sousa 
et al. 2013:1).  
According to Hanlon et al. (2010), conditional cash transfer programs represent a 
paradigmatic shift of development thinking in the global South. CCTs are a challenge to 
northern aid agencies with complicated development strategies and represent instead 
poverty reduction from the bottom up. Hanlon et al. argue that the poor should be the 
instigators of their own development; governments should commit to providing the 
resources the impoverished require instead of dictating what they should do. According to 
Hanlon et al., this means distributing monetary transfers to the neediest households so 
they can subsequently being breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty. 
Rawlings (2005) elaborates the use of demand side financing adopted by CCT 
programs to appropriately target the neediest populations. Demand side financing is in 
contrast with the customary supply side mechanisms for social services such as food aid 
and other general subsidies. CCTs also take advantage of market principles by increasing 
the purchasing power of participants via monetary transfers, as well as reflecting the 
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growing economic social policy of market orientated, demand side interventions. Adato 
and Hoddinott (2010) point out that cash is also efficient and flexible; it allows for more 
precise targeting of needy households, as well as giving participants spending discretion. 
It also prevents the creation of secondary markets and price distortion (p. 14).  
In rebuttal to this point, various Latin American scholars have labelled conditional 
cash transfers as a continuation of neoliberal policies as a result of the CCT respect for 
the free market. The emphasis on individual responsibility and the limited role for the 
state, combined with providing cash instead of an in-kind transfer, coincides with the 
suite of neoliberal policies (Barba, 2014; Medrano, 2013). Additionally, by providing 
monetary transfers, the World Bank and governments are still interpreting poverty as a 
monetary problem, such as being below $1.25 USD a day, instead of treating poverty as a 
structural issue. Abiding by rules of the free market is paramount as governments are 
encouraged to help correct market failures without challenging the idea that economic 
growth is the key solution to poverty reduction. Overall, Puello-Socarras and Gunturiz 
(2013) interpret CCTs as superficial answers to poverty reduction as the programs do not 
address the inequality that exists in a free market system. 
Along similar lines, Bentura (2014) furthers the argument that CCTs are 
inherently neoliberal by stating that the main objective of the programs, in conjunction 
with neoliberalism, is integration into the market. He points out the double standard of 
CCT social-political regulation: On the one hand, social services, as well as other goods 
and services, have been commercialized, thus reducing their access to poor populations; 
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on the other hand, the regulation of the excluded groups arises from their inability to 
participate in the market, therefore they are monitored via CCT programs. 
Much of the debate is revolved around the role the free market plays in CCTs and 
poverty reduction. Valencia (2008) concurs that CCTs represent a continuation of the 
neoliberal economic policies implemented in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Consequently, conditional cash transfer programs are more respectful of market 
principles than the traditional supply side interventions. Also, monetary transfers allows 
for compatibility with the market as cash avoids distortions of relative prices and gives 
participants freedom to spend their money on consumer goods. However, Valencia 
continues by admitting that the debate around CCTs should not be restricted to the 
extremes of neoliberalism or universal systems. He concludes by suggesting renewed 
participation of the state in the provision of basic social services in conjunction with more 
effective targeting of needy populations. 
In contrast, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund have consistently placed emphasis on the role economic 
growth plays in the reduction of poverty. According to a World Bank report, the average 
rise in income in middle class families is reflected proportionately in the income of the 
poorest fifth of society (Dollar & Kraay, 2001:1). Economic growth that trickles down to 
the poor can be obtained via liberalized trade and other macroeconomic policies that 
benefit the poor as much as they do the middle class. Dollar and Kraay also criticize “pro-
poor” policies such as public expenditure on basic social services as the “growth of 
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income of the poor does not appear to respond systematically” (p. 32). They conclude by 
stating how pro-economic growth policies such as fiscal discipline and openness to 
international trade should become the main focus of poverty reduction strategies.  These 
two contrasting opinions of Latin American and Western scholars and financial 
institutions represent the core issue of the role the market plays in poverty reduction. 
As a rebuttal to the World Bank, the United Nation’s Comisión Económica para 
América Latina (CEPAL—Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) 
develops the claim that economic growth cannot be the sole strategy for poverty 
reduction. In a 2002 CEPAL report, Lustig (2002) signals the double standard that exists 
between economic growth and poverty reduction. While economic growth can help 
reduce poverty, Lustig argues that the more unequal a society is, the less impact economic 
growth has on poverty reduction (p. 3). As well, if the government is focused on raising 
the average national income, these policies will have little effect if the geographical areas 
where the impoverished are concentrated are left out. While Lustig’s claim is valid, this 
issue is difficult to address as the majority of poor populations are traditionally found in 
rural areas, which have less employment opportunities and few connections with the 
private sector. Not only this but if the government growth strategy does not include 
unskilled manual labour, it will result in higher marginalization of the poor, as unskilled 
labour is one of the biggest economic assets the poor possess (pp. 5-9).  
Clavo (2011) elaborates on the connection between CCT programs and economic 
growth. The objectives of conditional cash transfers are to break the intergenerational 
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cycle of poverty by increasing the productivity of the poor via greater investment in 
human capital. This includes better health and higher levels of education. However, Clavo 
identifies a vital problem with CCT programs—the assumption that jobs will be available 
for the beneficiaries. On the contrary, she describes how many countries with CCT 
programs do not have sufficient economic growth to absorb the new generation of higher 
educated people (p. 67).  
This urgent problem of employment is reflected in a 2011 report issued by 
CEPAL about conditional cash transfer programs and their experiences in Latin America. 
While the report by Cecchini and Madariaga for CEPAL concedes that CCTs have had a 
significant impact in the short term reduction of poverty, they criticize the programs 
ability to integrate the beneficiaries into the formal market (Cecchini & Madariaga, 
2011). In Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, the report found that the majority of the participants 
were unable to sustainably insert themselves into the formal labour market, and that the 
informal sector is still the most feasible option (p. 146). There are limited job 
opportunities in rural areas where links with the private sector are few or non-existent. 
Clavo elaborates this point by demonstrating how in many rural regions in Mexico there 
were no returns on higher levels of education in the employment sector. The predominant 
employment options available in these regions do not require the higher levels of 
education that the participants have (p. 67).  
Possible solutions provided for these problems in conditional cash transfer 
programs is to diversify capacitation skills of participants and integrate CCTs with other 
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structural reforms (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; Clavo, 2011; Paes-Sousa et al. 2013). 
Economic growth should form part of the long-term CCT objectives as the benefits of 
human capital are expected to be absorbed into the formal economy. If not taken into 
account, poverty levels will remain the same despite the increased investment in human 
capital simply because the newly educated generation cannot find better employment. 
Despite the claims of CCT program success, the program itself is not the only answer to 
poverty. In order to achieve sustainable poverty reduction, investments must be made in 
other sectors of society in order to guarantee the success of the CCT program.  
 
4. Social Services and Conditional Cash Transfers in Mexico  
Since the 1970s, the Mexican federal government began targeting the poor by 
using integrated development policies (Yaschine & Orozco, 2010:55). Between 1970 and 
1990, Mexico’s federal government created various poverty reduction programs, 
primarily targeting the rural poor. Programs such as PIDER, SAM, and COPLAMAR2 
focused on rural farmers by promoting agricultural development, farming coops, food 
subsidises and consumption support (pp. 57-59).  
Unfortunately for the programs, Mexico in the 1980s suffered a severe economic 
crisis. Under the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) and conditional loans were handed out by the World Bank 
                                                          
2PIDER: Programa de Inversiones Públicas para el Desarrollo Rural 
SAM: Sistema Alimentario Mexicano  
COPLAMAR: Plan Nacional de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados 
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and the IMF in order to help stabilize the economy.  As part of the SAP, social spending 
was subsequently reduced which lead to an increase in poverty. 
In 1988 President Salinas de Gortari inherited a stable economy and until the end 
of his term in 1994 (Yaschine & Orozco, 2010:60). This allowed his administration to re-
invest in social services that had previously been cut. Consequently, the program 
PRONASOL3 was created to target those who did not feel the benefits of economic 
growth during his term. PRONASOL was an umbrella organization that coordinated 
programs in three main sub-spheres: social welfare, support for production, and regional 
development (Yaschine & Orozco, 2010:61). The policy style was described as ‘social 
liberalism’, which was the Mexican interpretation of adjustment with a human face. The 
aim of social liberalism was to adjust social policy to a development strategy that 
emphasizes the market in attaining growth and social integration (Ordóñez, 2012; 
Medrano, 2013). PRONASOL was directly primarily towards indigenous groups and 
those living in extreme poverty in both rural and urban areas. Their participation in the 
program was used as a condition to receive the benefits; in many ways it was the first 
type of CCT (Medrano, 2013).  
While PRONASOL achieved minor results in poverty reduction, it failed to 
specifically target the neediest populations and it did not deal with the root causes of 
poverty. As well, the program was accused of being used politically, as the main areas 
targeted were where the opposition parties had more control (Yaschine & Orozco, 2010). 
                                                          
3 Programa Nacional de Solidaridad  
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These failures were exacerbated during the 1994 pesos crisis after the signing of North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which lead to greater unrest about the 
growing levels of poverty (Yaschine & Orozco, 2010).  
Ernesto Zedillo was elected president under very contentious and questionable 
elections in 1994 (Yaschine & Orozco, 2010:62). As a result of the economic crisis and 
the questionable presidential win, Zedillo attempted to distance himself from the previous 
administration which was blamed for the social uprisings and pesos crisis. In an attempt 
to regain some legitimacy as president and to address the ever increasing levels of 
poverty, in 1997 PRONASOL was dismantled and Progresa-Oportunidades (PROP) was 
created.  
PROP is an innovative program currently being enacted that is the first of its kind 
to simultaneously incorporate nutrition, health, and education in an attempt to tackle the 
root causes of poverty: lack of education and poor health. The architect of the program is 
economist Santiago Levy, who describes the principle aim of PROP as fostering the 
development of human capital of the poor, allowing for greater productivity. It provides 
cash transfers for food as well as scholarships for children’s attendance in schools. These 
transfers are conditioned, meaning that families are required to comply with 
predetermined activities in order to receive the money. These conditions include health 
clinic attendance, the women’s participation in pláticas, or group workshops, about 
nutrition and health, as well as children’s attendance in schools.  
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As well, the program had a built in evaluation system run by the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). However the decision for the external evaluation 
is questionable, as some see it as a political move aimed at demonstrating how the 
governing administration was politically neutral, therefore indirectly increasing the PRI’s 
chance for re-election (Skoufias, 2005:65).  
The CCT program targets Mexicans living in extreme poverty. PROP uses a non-
discretionary system that is comprised of three stages: Firstly, geographical targeting to 
identify the poorest localities for rural settings and the poorest areas in urban settings; 
secondly, a proxy means testing to identify individual households; and thirdly, 
verification of the list of beneficiaries in a community assembly for rural cases 
(Rodriguez, 2008). The families can stay in the program for up to three years if they 
comply with all the conditions. After the three-year period the families are reassessed to 
see if they still qualify for the program. Since the aim of PROP is to break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty via increased investment in human capital, the quality 
of services remains key to successful human capital accumulation. One of the main 
critiques of the program notes the need for the improvement in the quality of services, 
specifically in education (Adato & Hoddinott, 2010; Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; 
Barrientos & Santibañez, 2009; Lustig, 2002). Critics argue that the positive effects of 
human capital investment will be limited if the quality of the services provided is poor.  
Education is often cited as the most important tool for poverty reduction. In 
Mexico, a study by Medrano (2013) revealed that education and economic growth were 
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the most common factors cited by Mexican elites as the most appropriate tools for 
poverty reduction (p. 217). Education is understood as the precursor to boosting economic 
growth, and subsequently investment in children’s human capital was met with 
considerable favour. While various studies indicate the improved attendance rates of 
children in primary, secondary and preparatory schools, many of these fail to discuss the 
quality of the education received. Clavo (2011) signals the assumption that human capital 
will automatically translate into improved standards of living and better employment. She 
states that this cannot be taken for granted as the transformation of human capital is 
strongly mediated by the quality of the resources and the ability of the economy to later 
absorb the next generation of higher educated people. 
However there is insufficient literature describing the quality of education 
provided in the regions where PROP operates, as well as the cause-effect relationship that 
poor quality education has on the beneficiaries. This is an important area for future study 
as education is considered a key component of CCT poverty reduction strategy. Studies 
investigating this problem within the program would allow for the federal government to 
address the issues. Not only this, but the studies would also aid in the improvement of the 
entire Mexican educational system, which in turn would help spur economic growth.   
Despite the success of PROP, an alarming social trend has been evolving: poverty 
rates have been steadily increasing since 2006. In spite of this trend, there is also a 
considerable lack of academic studies done on why poverty levels in Mexico keep 
increasing despite critically acclaimed success of the program. Some Mexican 
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newspapers such as La Jornada have provided details about the severe limitations of 
PROP; however, few academics or institutions have researched the underlying causes of 
these faults.  
Levy (2007) states that the program will not reduce poverty since it is only 
focused on one group and is not a complete strategy to combat poverty (p. 2). He 
describes how the program lacks support in terms of creating and providing jobs for the 
graduates of the program. The majority of the support provided to the participants ends 
before the children who have finished school are incorporated into the workforce.  As 
well, there is a major risk in relying solely upon economic growth to create jobs and 
absorb the more highly educated graduates of the program. The government instead needs 
to incorporate a multi-faced strategy that incorporates economic growth, the composition 
and geographical distribution of public and private investment, along with better 
provision of social security (pp. 10, 67).  
The Mexican newspaper La Jornada is also critical of the program. It describes 
how PROGRESA is not effective in combatting poverty because the program has 
insufficient overage (Norandi, 2008). According to a study published in by the Mexican 
institute CONEVAL, PROP does not reach the most marginalized and poorest 
communities as they are located too far from educational and health care centres. 
Subsequently, these families do not qualify to participate in the social service program 
and therefore receive no benefits or support (Norandi, 2008). Consequently, the program 
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is failing to target the most vulnerable populations which it claims to protect and help 
escape from poverty.  
The Mexican federal Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL) has also 
acknowledged the limitations of the PROP program in lifting families out of poverty. In 
2010 SEDESOL stated that the program is insufficient to aid in poverty reduction, the 
program rather aids in containing the growth of poverty (Enciso, 2010). This is an 
important area for investigation, as it signifies that there is a fundamental problem within 
PROP and other areas of Mexican society. If these issues are not addressed, poverty 
levels will continue to increase despite the social service programs in place. 
In the empirical section that follows, I will be examining data related to social 
service programs and development and conditional cash transfers and their role in 
development. Following this, I will provide information on conditional cash transfers in 
Latin America, Mexican economic policy from 1990-2012, and finally the social service 
program PROP. This thesis will be arguing that the suite of policy regimes associated 
with neoliberal macroeconomic planning have adversely affected the objectives, 
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1. Social Service Programs and Development 
In the 1980s, neoliberal reforms were implemented in many countries around the 
world, mainly through the provision of debt relief and loans. The loans received from 
various IFIs were conditioned, meaning that the country had to comply with the 
stipulations in order to receive them. Table 1 shows the most common loan conditions 
and the amount of countries it was imposed upon: 
Table 1 
Loan Conditions by Expenditure Reform Objective, 1980-1994 
Condition Number of countries on 
which condition was 
imposed 




Social sector restructuring 60 
Poverty alleviation 10 
Source: Data adapted from Bangura, 2000:11. 
It is clear that expenditure reforms were the most common loan condition, 
followed by social sector restructuring. These cuts had major impacts on the provision 
and quality of basic social services, especially since wide-spread privatization was also 
imposed. The World Bank aimed to address fiscal problems as well as economic 
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stabilization, and as a result, education investment was drastically cut and further loan 
conditions were introduced. These extra conditions targeted civil service wages and 
employment that continued to damage both education and health sectors (Bangura, 
2000:14).  
Those in favour of the privatization of social services argue that the funding 
required presents a major drain on government budgets. However, industrialized countries 
backing IFIs that promote privatization in the developing world are the ones that spend 
the most on social security. Health care is the most expensive out of total social security 
expenditure for all regions, with the exceptions of Asia and Europe, where pensions are 
the most costly service, as seen below in Table 2: 
Table 2 







Total Soc. Security 
expenditure 
Africa 1.4 1.7 1.2 4.3 
Asia 3.0 2.7 0.7 6.4 
Europe 12.1 6.3 6.4 24.8 
LAC 2.1 2.8 3.9 8.8 
North 
America 
7.1 7.5 2.0 16.6 
Oceania 4.9 5.6 5.6 16.1 
 Source: Reproduced from De Ferranti, 2004:269.  
Europe has the highest social security expenditure, which is more than six times 
what Africa invests and three times that of Latin America. North American spends the 
most on health care, while their social security expenditure total is double that of Latin 
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America. These numbers can in part be explained from the loan conditions imposed on 
developing countries as seen previously in Table 1.  
For example, in Africa, government and WB expenditure on education, as an 
average percentage of GDP in 21 countries, fell from 4.6% in 1980 to 2.6% in 1985. The 
World Bank contribution as a percentage of education budgets in 21 countries was almost 
non-existent, as it was slashed from 37.7% in 1975 to only 0.9% in 1985. As well, 
education as a percentage of total government budgets dropped from 20% to 9.8% from 
1980-1985 (Bangura, 2000:14).  
The effects of education cuts can also be seen in Indian and Bangladeshi public 
sector teachers, who had absence rates ranging from 13 to 26 per cent in 2004. UNRISD 
elaborates by stating how trained personnel are drawn to private sector employment 
opportunities by better pay and working conditions. This draws the professionals away 
from the public sector, thus worsening the quality of public social service provision which 
are often thinly stretched (p. 171; Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005:154).  
Issues in education provision in developing countries was not the only public 
sector affected by IFI structural loans. Health services also suffered from the lack of 
available resources. For example, poorly paid public sector doctors in various African 
nations have been found to supplement their low income by selling drugs that were 
intended for free distribution (Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005:144). This has consequently 
lead to the drugs being distributed among the relatively non-poor who can afford them 
while denying treatments to indigent populations.   
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However, instead of reducing costs, there is increasing evidence that greater  
privatization of health services is resulting in rising costs in both low and middle income 
countries (Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005:154). In Vietnam, the average cost of hospital 
admission was, in 2001, equivalent to two months wages, therefore resulting in loans and 
debts. Consequently, 60% of poor households were in debt with one-third of them citing 
medical costs as the main reason (Mehrotra & Delamonica, 2005:155). Greater exclusion 
and inequality in treatment are also associated with higher levels of privatization of 
primary health care services. 
As a result of the commercialization of basic social services in the global South, 
private spending as a percentage of total health expenditure is significantly higher in low 
income countries and among lower income groups. Lower income groups are much more 
likely to face out of pocket payments compared to their wealthier counterparts (UNRISD, 
2010:169). In fact, according to UNRISD (2010), 5.6 billion people in low and middle 
income countries finance over half of their health care spending via out of pocket 
payments, and annually 100 million people are pushed into poverty due to excessive 
health care costs (p. 169).  
It can therefore be seen that greater commercialization of basic social services can 
have a profound negative impact for poor and vulnerable populations, as well as lowering 
the overall quality of service. However developing countries do not always have a choice 
with regards to social service funding, as loan and debt relief conditions often include 
social sector restructuring. One result of the restructuring is that the cost of basic social 
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services in heavily privatized and fragmented systems have higher costs for those seeking 
treatment, which in turn puts more economic strain on poor and vulnerable families. Also, 
a significant increase in private sector growth may lead to a drain of resources for public 
services, subsequently increasing the strain on an already thinly-stretched public sector.  
 
2. Conditional Cash Transfers and Development 
The primary objective of a cash transfer program is to aid a household’s ability to 
meet their basic consumption needs (Slater, 2008:10). Some critics argue that the 
implementation of cash transfer programs are too expensive, especially for small 
impoverished states. This is because CCT budgets often have higher initial start-up costs 
due to necessary investment in certain infrastructures and institutions that the program 
relies upon (Adato & Hoddinott, 2007). However, cash transfer programs have some of 
the lowest costs with the highest return rates, especially when compared to other social 
service programs such as traditional food subsidies.  
In India, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme guarantees each rural 
household 100 days of unskilled wage labour per year. The wage provided is no less than 
60 Rupees per day ($1.25 USD). The program is typically used in April when agricultural 
work is limited (Hanlon et al. 2010:41-42). Launched in 2006, the program expanded to 
include all 600 rural districts by 2009. Participants are typically employed on small scale 
construction projects that are labour intensive. The average salary provided is $1.70 USD 
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per day with a household average of 40 days of work per year. The program has a cost of 
around 4 billion, or 0.3% of GDP (Ibid).  
In contrast, the Indian food subsidy program Targeted Public Distribution System 
had a budget in 2009 of 12.4 billion USD, or 1% of GDP (Jha et al. 2013:888). However, 
the effect it had for the poor was very minimal. In order to receive the subsidies, the 
respective state governments must properly identify households that qualify for BPL 
(Below Poverty Line) cards which in turn permits the households to purchase subsidized 
food. In a survey conducted in 2004-2005, only 37.6% of rural households below the 
poverty line had BPL cards, and 25.7% in urban areas (Jha et al. 2013:889). As well, the 
program had substantial leakages, with 36.7% of the subsidized grain being sold to non-
poor households. Furthermore, 58% of the subsidized food grain did not reach families 
below the poverty line due to targeting errors, and 10% of all grains were also spoilt 
during transportation and storage. As a result of the high cost of handling food grains, the 
government ultimately spends 8.5  Rupees per 1 Rupee transferred to the poor (Jha et al. 
2013:889).  
Conditional cash transfers are not only more cost effective but they have lower 
leakage rates. By targeting only the extreme poor using proxy-means testing and various 
data collected by government agencies, CCTs have consistently proved to be the best 
targeted social service programs (Bastagli, 2010:12). This improved targeting means that 
the neediest indigent populations receive the cash transfer, therefore improving their 
ability to meet basic consumption needs. 
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However, conditional cash transfers link this short term objective with longer term 
development aims of human capital accumulation.  The bulk of these programs are 
targeted towards families living in extreme poverty. In CCTs, the poor’s lack of human 
capital is a result of inadequate family practices that restrains them from being 
sufficiently competitive to participate in the market (Barba, 2014:110). Consequently, the 
families are trapped in the intergenerational cycle of poverty. This inadequate family 
practice is rectified in CCTs via the conditions attached to the transfer. 
The most common conditions of CCTs, school enrollment for children and health 
clinic attendance, are frequently used as they promote greater investment in the human 
capital of children. According to Fiszbein and Schady (2009), CCT programs worldwide 
have resulted in a greater uptake of social services by the beneficiaries (p. 160). School 
enrollment rates have increased, especially in higher grades where base enrollment was 
low, as seen in Table 3. As well, there has been greater uptake of preventative health care 
services, as seen in Table 4.  
Table 3 
Impact CCTs on School Enrollment 
Country Program Age/Grade Base Enrollment 
(%) 
Impact 















Grades 7-9 65.0 21.4 




Uptake of Health Services from Various CCTs 

























visit at least once 
in past 6 months 
0-3 69.8 8.4 




visit at least once 
in past month 
0-3 44.0 20.2 
Source: Adapted from Fiszbein and Schady, 2009:137-138. 
 
This data demonstrates how CCT programs can have a positive impact on the uptake of 
social services previously underused by indigent groups. This increased usage is the main 
tool used for breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty via the accumulation of 
human capital in CCT programs. Despite the impressive nature of these statistics, it is 
crucial to remember that unless the services are of good quality, there will be no 
significant gains in human capital formation.   
CCTs have not consistently demonstrated reductions in short term or long term 
poverty, nor have they shown signs of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty 
despite the increased usage in social services (Barba, 2014:106; Borzutzky, 2012:1). This 
can be understood mainly as a result of the poor quality of the basic social services 
provided. CCT policy assumes that greater levels of education automatically translates 
into greater human capital, without taking into consideration the importance of service 
quality. Evaluations of CCT programs contribute to this limitation, as they tend to focus 
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solely on the uptake of the services and other quantitative information about the program, 
instead of investigating the quality (Barba, 2014:107). This is a critical point for further 





















3. CCTs in Latin America  
Cash transfer programs have their origins in the 1980s and 1990s, in which 
various trends contributed to a shift in international development thinking (Paes-Sousa et 
al. 2013). Economic crisis and unstable growth during the 1980s and 1990s contributed to 
increased poverty, as seen below in Figure 1: 
Figure 1 
Latin American and Caribbean Poverty Headcount Ratio vs. GDP Annual Growth (%) 
1980-2010 
 
Source: World Bank GDP Growth (Annual %) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
and World Bank Poverty Headcount Ratio at $2 a Day (PPP) (% of Population) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY. Elaborated by the author.  
 
Poverty levels rose during the 1980s as GDP fell, however the renewed growth during the 
1990s enabled Latin American governments to focus on increasing social spending. To 
target extreme poverty, Mexico and Brazil implemented the first conditional cash transfer 
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transfer programs in the world. Eighteen countries implement some type of cash transfer 
program, ranging from CCTs such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil, to the Bolivian program 
Renta Dignidad, which is Latin America’s only universal, non-contributory pension 
(Hanlon et al. 2010:43-44). Table 5, provides a condensed list of the most prevalent Latin 
American cash transfer programs, along with their coverage and cost as a per cent of 
GDP. 
Table 5 
Various CCT program Costs and Coverage 
Country Program Cost as % GDP Coverage 
Mexico Progresa-
Oportunidades 
0.39% (2005) 5 million families, 24 
million people 
Brazil Bolsa Familia 0.41 % (2006) 11.2 million families 
Nicaragua Red de Protección 
Social 
0.22% (2005) 24 000 families 
Argentina Plan Jefas y Jefes 0.80% (2003) 1.9 million people 
Peru Peru Juntos 0.11% (2006) 71 000 families 
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano 
0.60% (2005) 1 million families 
Bolivia Renta Dignidad 1% (2008) 97% eligible population 
covered  
Source: Adapted from Valencia, 2008:476. 
These programs have seen a degree of success in reducing income poverty, 
despite the programs’ low operating cost. In Brazil, Bolsa Familia contributed to a 12% 
reduction in the poverty gap as well as a 10% reduction in the Gini coefficient from 2001-
2005 (Bastagli, 2010:12). In Mexico, PROP reduced the poverty gap in rural areas by 
19% from 1996-2006. According to a 2011 CEPAL report, 10.3% of per capita income of 
beneficiary households is provided by CCTs and other public welfare transfers (pp. 117-
118). This is enough to lift certain beneficiary households above the indigent line, thus 
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reducing the poverty gap. However, while CCT programs have successfully reduced the 
poverty gap, they have shown no significant impact on the headcount ratio of poverty 
(Bastagli, 2010:12).  
 The raison d’ȇtre of conditional cash transfer programs is to break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty via increased investment in human capital, thus 
decreasing the headcount ratio of poverty. It is understood that human capital leads to 
improved integration into the labour market. Nonetheless, beneficiaries in various CCT 
programs have failed to gain stable employment in a sustainable manner (Cecchini & 
Madariaga, 2011:139). In the Chilean program Chile Solidario, households are required 
to have at least one family member working regularly with stable income as a 
requirement to exit the program. Unfortunately, this prerequisite has an 83.3% failure rate 
(Ibid.). In Brazil, those who gain employment do not work for periods longer than eleven 
months, while beneficiaries in Mexico’s PROP program tend to work in the informal 
labour market (Ibid.). This limitation of CCT programs will be explored in depth in the 
next section, specifically examining the Mexican PROP program.  
 The nature of targeting in CCTs has also come under criticism, especially by the 
poor. Many people in communities where CCTs are present have questioned the nature of 
selection. The distinctions made between those who are absorbed into the program and 
those who are not is seen as arbitrary. This point is only exacerbated when people who do 
not need aid are included while those who do are excluded (Barba, 2014:109). In Brazil 
and Mexico, the total poor population (moderate and extreme) that was not included in 
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their CCT programs was 59% and 70% respectively. In 2004, Bolsa Familia and PROP 
also had respective inclusion errors of 49% and 36% (Barba, 2014:109). While the 
argument can be made that these programs were designed to incorporate only those living 
in extreme poverty, it remains difficult to justify their usage when such a large number of 
the total poor population is excluded from these services. This argument will also be 
examined in the next section with regards to Mexico’s PROP, as well being explored in 
my analysis.  
 
4. General Background on Mexico  
Located in between the United States of America (U.S.) and Guatemala, Mexico 
is Latin America’s second largest economy and is a vital link for Central and South 
America to the U.S.  It shares a 3,110 km long border with the United States, which is 
also its biggest trading partner. The Mexican economy is based largely on the production 
and sale of petroleum and manufactured exports, such as cars. Remittances are also a fast 
growing source of revenue; in 2012 it contributed 22.4 billion to the economy 
(CNNExpansion).  
Mexico is divided into 31 states and one Federal District. The capital, Mexico 








Map of Mexico 
 
Source: http://www.hima.sk/index.php/en/news/101-hima-has-been-awarded-the-1st-project-in-mexico  
 
Mexico has a population of 112 million people, in which roughly 25 million reside 
in the capital and the surrounding valley. The Mexican poverty institute CONEVAL 
estimated that in 2012, 53.5 million people lived in poverty. Of that population, an 
estimated 41.8 million lived in moderate poverty and 11.5 million in extreme poverty. 
Only 20.7% of the Mexican population, or 23.2 million people, were classified as neither 
poor nor vulnerable (CONEVAL, 2013:12).  
In Table 6 below, it is clear that Mexico’s poor population is overwhelmingly 
concentrated in urban areas, with incidences of extreme poverty being almost evenly 





Distribution of Poverty in Mexico, Rural vs. Urban 2010-2012 
Localities 2010 (values in millions) 2012 (values in millions) 
 Total Moderate Extreme Total Moderate Extreme 
Total 52.8 39.6 13.2 53.3 41.8 11.5 
Rural 17.2 10.1 7.1 16.7 10.9 5.8 
Urban 35.6 29.5 6.1 36.6 30.9 5.7 
Source: Adapted from CONEVAL, 2013:103. 
  
It is also important to note that extreme poverty has decreased, most notably in rural 
areas, however levels of moderate poverty in Mexico have increased. Although urban 
poverty is greater in numbers than rural poverty, rural areas have a higher percentage of 
indigent populations living in conditions of extreme poverty. 
 
5. Social Services and Conditional Cash Transfers in Mexico 
5.1 Mexico Macroeconomic Policy 1980-2012 
Mexico’s macroeconomic policy shift from import substitution industrialization 
(ISI) to neoliberalism has its roots in the 1982 economic crisis (Hogan & Hara, 2010). 
After the discovery of massive oil reserves in the country, the federal government 
increased the amount of state owned enterprises by 400% during the 1970s. However, 
with the newly acquired state enterprises, expenditure began to outpace the oil revenue 
and government tax income. As a result, the rate of inflation rose sharply in the early 
1980s (Hogan & Hara, 2010). When oil prices fell in 1981. PEMEX announced that 
petroleum production would be insufficient to revive the economy (Hogan & Hara, 
2010:10). Foreign loans were then necessary in order to sustain the economy and by the 
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end of 1981, 78 billion dollars was borrowed. By 1982 crisis struck with the cost of 
servicing the debt surpassing oil and other state revenue (Hogan & Hara, 2010:11).  
1982 was election year in Mexico and the presidential debates were dominated by 
the economic crisis. Miguel de la Madrid was elected and immediately was locked into an 
IMF bailout (Hogan & Hara, 2011:13). His main macroeconomic policies were to move 
away from ISI towards trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. In 1986 de la 
Madrid signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), thus introducing 
market liberalization and free trade legislature (Sanchez, 2009: 255). These policies were 
coupled with fiscal and monetary austerity measures in order to stabilize the economy and 
reduce the fiscal deficit (Hogan & Hara, 2011:13; Ordóñez, 2012:216).  
During de la Madrid’s sexenio, 1,155 state owned enterprises were sold off to 
private companies and social expenditure was drastically reduced. From 1981-1988, 
social spending was cut from 9.3% to 6.1%. Poverty reduction programs were the most 
affected, as only two remained after the budgetary changes (Ordóñez, 2012:215-216). In 
1982, social spending represented 10.9% of GDP, however by 1989 it was reduced to 
4.9%, while food subsidies dwindled from 1.25% of GDP in 1983 to just 0.37% in 1988 
(Yaschine & Orozco, 2010:60).  By the end of his presidential term, de la Madrid had 
managed to achieve a growth rate in real GDP of 2.8% and reduce inflation to 51.7% 
(Pastor and Wise, 2002: 182).  
The subsequent 1988 election brought Carlos Salinas de Gortari to presidential 
power. Salinas continued the neoliberal reforms that his predecessor had begun, as well as 
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implementing deep structural reforms (Pastor & Wise, 2003:183). The Mexican financial 
sector was fully liberalized and deregulated, and eighteen nationalized banks were sold to 
the private sector. In addition, the state airline, steel company, and telephone companies 
were sold and commercialized. More importantly, the communal farming ejido system 
was dismantled (Pastor and Wise, 2003:183).  The Salinas administration hasted to 
privatize a large portion of state assets and signed one of the most well-known free trade 
agreements, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA raised 
exports and foreign investment, but this only made profits for a few multinational 
corporations. It consequently generated more social inequality by augmenting poverty 
levels and income inequality (Sanchez, 2009:261).  
Throughout the Salinas sexenio, the economy began to register moderate and 
sustained growth which permitted for renewed investment in social development and 
programs. In 1993, expenditure levels returned to the pre-economic crisis levels of the 
early 1980s and in 1994, a historic maximum was invested (Ordóñez, 2012:218). In this 
context, Salinas implemented the program PRONASOL, which will be discussed in 
greater depth in the following section. While Mexico began to recuperate from the 
financial crisis, the policies implemented were still insufficient to regain the standard of 
living before the 1982 economic crash (Ordóñez, 2012).  
Despite the apparent gains made by the Salinas administration, the peso crashed 
yet again in 1994 and was subsequently devalued (Hogan & Hara, 2011). Another 
multilateral bailout package worth $50 billion USD was issued and once more social 
46 
 
expenditure was reduced by about 15% (Sanchez, 2009:261; Tetreault, 2012:52). As the 
Mexican economy began to recover from the financial crisis in 1996, President Ernesto 
Zedillo implemented Progresa-Oportunidades in the following year as a measure to 
combat the heightened levels of poverty.  
In 2000, Vicente Fox was elected the first non-PRI president for seventy years. 
Fox did not, however, make any drastic changes to Mexican macroeconomic policy. GDP 
growth from 2001-2006 averaged an annual rate of 2.3% and the economy remained 
relatively stable (Ordóñez, 2012). Fox did pass a critical reform to Article 126 of the 
Mexican Constitution; an amendment that established as a constitutional principle a 
balanced budget, subject only to temporary exemptions (Boltvinik, 2012:53). 
Subsequently, the principle objectives of the Bank of Mexico and of the Secretary of 
Inland Revenue and Public Credit (SHCP) was orientated towards inflation control and 
budgetary balance. This meant sacrifices in social spending in order to maintain fiscal 
balance. These changes were designed to help establish a base for sustainable 
development and equal distribution of public resources.  
Fox also proposed a reduction in certain income taxes for companies that make 
additional contributions to pension funds and other long term investments, as well as 
those who reinvest in ways that benefit employment creation (Gonzalez & Anabitarte, 
2001).  The argument for these tax reductions was that it takes advantage of the various 
free trade agreements by promoting a more favourable condition for companies, as they 
are the ones that save, invest, and create jobs, . This would allow for the federal 
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government to create a budget surplus, as the need for the government to stimulate job 
creation and make pension contributions would be lessened.  
 (Boltvinik, 2012:52-53; Gonzalez & Anabitarte, 2001).  
 Vicente Fox also passed the General Law of Social Development in 2003. It 
established the legal framework to create CONEVAL and stipulated that social spending 
must increase every year in proportion to the expected GDP growth (Tetreault, 2012: 56). 
This legislature is a vital start to protecting social spending, as it was designed so that the 
government cannot drastically reduce social expenditure during economic crisis, despite 
the previous reforms to Article 126 that outline the principles of fiscal balance (Tetreault, 
2012:56). Nevertheless, it does have some drawbacks. The wording used is ambiguous, as 
it does not define what ‘social development’ is, and it confuses the terms 
‘marginalization’, ‘poverty’, and ‘vulnerability’. It also does not establish any means for 
the population to demand their social rights as outlined in Mexican law. Despite these 
limitations, it has served to institutionally consolidate and modestly expand the 
antipoverty strategy in a period of relatively stable economic growth (Tetreault, 2012:57).  
Neoliberalism continued to be the dominant philosophy and the Fox and Calderon 
(2006-2012) administrations continued to defend and sustain this macroeconomic and 
social policy. Calderon faced the 2008 economic crisis which once again devastated the 
Mexican economy. The president focused on deregulation, labour flexibility, and salary 
suppression, with the hope that it would create the necessary conditions for revitalized 
economic growth and private sector contracts (Tetreault, 2012:58). Calderon’s strategy 
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did not work, as formal sector employment creation could not keep up with the growth 
rate of the labour force. In 2006, formal employment represented only 39.8% of the 
economically active population, while the informal sector grew to 25.78 million workers 
(Tetreault, 2012:59).  
Due in part to the inability of the Mexican economy to absorb the available 
workforce, poverty rates continue to increase. In summary, Figure 3 plots poverty levels 
against GDP growth from 1989-2012. 
Figure 3 
Poverty vs GDP in Mexico 1980-2012 
 
Source: World Bank GDP Growth (Annual %)  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG and World Bank Poverty Headcount Ratio at 
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Figure 3 reveals the correlation between GDP and poverty levels, and how poverty has 
increased during times of economic crisis. It also shows the impact that a stable growth 
rate can have on reducing overall poverty levels.  
 
5.2 Social Service Policy in Mexico 1988-2012 
 During the sexenio of Salinas de Gortari, the umbrella organization PRONASOL 
(National Solidarity Program) was introduced. The program was established in the 
context of social liberalism, which in essence was the Mexican version of ‘adjustment 
with a human face’. Social liberalism adhered to the principles of the free market by 
severing the fight against poverty from any factors that negatively affected the behaviour 
of macroeconomic variables or created distortions in the market (Ordóñez, 2012:229; 
Tetreault, 2012:51).  As a result of this, deficit was the primary concern of the Salinas 
administration, thus spurring the elimination of most subsidies related to the production 
and consumption of food (Ordóñez, 2012:229). Social liberalism became the emerging 
face of social policy in the new neoliberal era in Mexico.  
 The main policy objective of PRONASOL was to alleviate extreme poverty in 
both rural and urban areas. It consisted of various sub-programs, one of which was 
Children in Solidarity which aimed to prevent poor children from dropping out of school 
before completing their primary education (Medrano, 2013:208). In many ways, 
PRONASOL was the first attempt of a CCT program in Mexico, as it not only focused on 
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education and only the extreme poor, but it also believed that the poor must actively 
participate in order to receive the benefits (Medrano, 2013:208) 
 When launched in 1989, PRONASOL had a budget of $1,640 million pesos. In its 
final year, 1994, the budget reached $9,233 million pesos, or roughly 0.65% of GDP 
(Tetreault, 2012:51). However PRONASOL had no transparency and was strongly 
centralized in federal government hands. This lead to accusations of the program being 
used solely for political purposes, as it had a stronger presence in opposition controlled 
areas (Tetreault, 2012). The program contained the growth of poverty during its 
operation, however it did not contribute significantly to its reduction. 
 When Ernesto Zedillo assumed the presidency in 1994, his first move was to shift 
the focus of the country’s social policy to human capital formation in cost effective via 
cost effective programs (Sanchez, 2009:261). He dismantled PRONASOL, which, despite 
its shortcomings, was the only source of access to social services for many poor 
Mexicans. Subsequently, the economic crisis of 1994 left many of the most poor and 
vulnerable Mexican citizens without any coherent poverty strategy. The creation of 
Progresa-Oportunidades in 1997 came only once the economy had recuperated, since 
cuts to social expenditure had occurred during the crisis. During the remaining years of 
the Zedillo presidency, PROP was the main poverty alleviation strategy implemented.  
 From 2000-2012, both Felipe Calderon and Vicente Fox attempted to create a 
wider policy framework which would coordinate and integrate all social programs 
directed towards poverty reduction. Fox created CONTIGO, and it was designed to 
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complement PROP with other social programs, mainly focusing on job opportunities, 
social protection, and the creation of patrimony in the form of homes and infrastructure 
(FAIS) (Tetreault, 2012:54). However, 85% of the CONTIGO budget went to only two of 
those poverty reduction strategies: PROP and FAIS. Both programs represented more 
than 50% of the entire federal budget for fighting extreme poverty in 2003, with 45,121 
million pesos allocated. CONTIGO investment in employment creation was only 12.5%, 
and it was principally directed towards temporary employment schemes and microfinance 
(Tetreault, 2012:55). 
 In 2008 Calderon launched Vivir Mejor. It had the same intentions as CONTIGO, 
whereby it aimed to coordinate and integrate the diverse public poverty reduction 
programs under one guiding institution (Tetreault, 2012:58; Ordóñez, 2012:230). In the 
same manner, Vivir Mejor was primarily discourse. It did not introduce any new 
mechanisms of coordination, nor were any new programs incorporated. It was, in essence, 
the umbrella organization inherited from Fox. PROP and FAIS continued to dominate 
expenditure, with employment creation receiving 1.99% of the total poverty reduction 
budget (Tetreault, 2012:58).   
 
5.3 Progresa-Oportunidades  
The program Progresa-Oportunidades (PROP) was launched in 1997 and initially 
included 140,000 households. It was deployed in poor rural communities which were 
selected based on both locality and household characteristics. Currently, PROP operates 
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in both rural and urban zones, in every municipality in the country. A total of 5.8 million 
families (22.4%) are impacted by this scheme. (Tetreault, 2012:64). The average amount 
received by beneficiary families is 728 pesos per month, equivalent to sixty Canadian 
dollars (Tetreault, 2012:64).   
The main architect of this program is economist Santiago Levy. While designing 
PROP, he detailed five guiding principles: 
1. Poverty programs must be congruent with structural reforms, and 
therefore must avoid generalized subsidies and price controls, which 
introduce counterproductive distortions into the market. 
2. It is necessary to maintain fiscal balance, poverty programs must only get 
to the target population and so do in an efficient and cost effective 
manner. 
3. The program must distinguish between moderate and extreme poverty. 
4. Extreme poverty is not exclusively in rural areas, but the majority of it is. 
5. Policies for those in extreme poverty must take advantage of the 
complimentary nature of health, nutrition, and education. (Tetreault, 
2012:53).  
These principles are very reminiscent of classical neoliberal economics with the policies 
being congruent with structural reforms and maintaining fiscal balance. These guidelines 
also are reflective of social liberalism; poverty reduction that does not distort the market.  
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The distinction that Levy makes between extreme and moderate poverty is also a 
key factor in determining who is eligible for the program. In order to qualify, a family 
must be in a selected locality and meet specific qualifications as outlined by PROP. Most 
importantly, the municipality in which the family resides must have both a primary school 
and a health clinic within a 5km radius. If one or both of these institutions is missing, then 
the family is ineligible for the program even if they are classified as extremely 
marginalized with a high incidence of poverty (Tetreault, 2012:60). This is done in order 
for the program to be more cost effective, fulfilling Levy’s second principle, as building 
the missing institutions would be expensive in terms of infrastructure but also in the long 
term for staff wages.  
In keeping with Levy’s guiding principles, PROP beneficiaries are required to 
forgo any existing transfers and support from other programs, resulting in less ‘double 
dipping’ of social support (De Ferranti, 2004:279). PROP has also achieved extensive 
coverage while maintaining a very low cost in terms of GDP; PROP consumed 0.4% of 
GDP in 2012. The majority of the money is used for the education scholarships, followed 









Budgetary Breakdown of PROP 2001-2012 






2001 5,584,800,000 2,099,805,302 5,317,691,900 13,002,297,202 0.13 
2003 10,999,518,895 2,375,851,096 7,920,544,720 21,295,914,711 0.22 
2004 11,987,819,376 3,290,900,091 10,546,354,000 25,825,073,467 0.25 
2005 15,468,435,596 3,767,053,560 10,546,354,000 29,781,843,156 0.26 
2006 16,550,000,000 3,800,811,617 11,208,917,170 31,559,728,787 0.25 
2007 16,550,000,000 3,928,804,439 14,310,125,045 34,788,929,484 0.25 
2008 17,350,000,000 3,430,216,730 16,430,848,840 37,211,065,570 0.26 
2009 18,182,800,000 3,466,985,864 24,413,067,440 46,062,853,304 0.39 
2010 22,860,520,104 4,926,496,104 34,273,855,107 62,060,871,315 0.45 
2011 24,358,293,857 5,123,600,000 35,355,077,096 64,836,970,953 0.42 
2012 22,758,293,857 5,314,414,228 34,941,400,000 63,014,108,085 0.40 
 
Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Presupuesto de Egresos. Ramos 11, 12, and 
20. Análisis Funcional Programático Económico (AFPE or AP). 
http://www.shcp.gob.mx/EGRESOS/PEF/Paginas/PresupuestodeEgresos.aspx Elaborated by the 
author.  
 
The education portion of the PROP budget considers only the scholarships 
provided to the children. Schools rely upon other sources for funding infrastructure and 
other administrative costs. The majority of this money comes from other programs, such 
as Quality Schools Program (PEC), National Reading Program, and Support for School 
Management. However, data was only available for PEC, but it did not specify where the 
money was allocated. The information pertaining to PEC expenditure is provided in the 
Appendix.  
One of the main objectives of PROP is to foster the development of human capital 
of children in poor families. This is done via the conditions that are attached to the 
transfer. The two principle conditions of the program are children’s school attendance and 
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regular health check-ups. In terms of usage of social services, PROP beneficiaries have 
shown an uptake in education and health services. Beginning with education, prior to 
PROP, primary schools had a 93% enrollment rate, junior high had 67% enrollment for 
girls and 73% enrollment for boys, and only 58% of those who had successfully 
completed junior high progressed to high school (De Ferranti, 2004:277). 
After the implementation of PROP, enrollment in grades 3 through 6 saw a 2.2 
percentage point increase in the 1997-99 period and a 4.9 % increase in junior high 
(SEDESOL 1999:174). In 2009, there was a. 1.9% increase in grades 0-5, and an 8.7% 
increase in children registered in grade 6 (SEDESOL, 1999:166; Fiszbein and Schady, 
2009:128-129). De Ferranti (2004) shows that the enrollment rate in the first years of 
junior high grew by 7.2-9.3% for girls and 3.5-5.8% for boys. He contributes these higher 
rates to students transitioning from grade 6 to junior high, rather than encouraging 
students who had previously dropped out to return (p. 277). With regard to the extra years 
of schooling obtained, girls added 0.72 extra years of schooling, while boys added 0.64 
extra years. The author estimated that these educational gains are consistent with an 
overall increase of 8% in earnings once they become adults (De Ferranti, 2004:278).  
Health services have also seen a rise in usage. As a result of greater clinic 
attendance, the diets of the participants have improved and they generally benefit from 
better health. Infants are taller and of greater weight, and there have been reductions in 
the child mortality rate, stunting, and illness (Tetreault, 2012:66). Preventative health 
visits for women in their first trimester of pregnancy witnessed an 8% increase, which 
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partly contributes to the better health of infants. An improvement in adult health has also 
been seen, with fewer cases of anemia and parents taking fewer sick days. Median food 
expenditure in PROP families has also increased by 11% (De Ferranti, 2004:279). 
The data presented on health and education looks very positive at face value; 
children are going to school for longer periods of time and have better nutritional and 
health status due to the frequent health check-ups. However the quality of the services 
presents a major challenge to the potential success of the program. 
According to a 2008 SEDSEOL external evaluation compiled by Campos (2008) 
of PROP, the quality of the institutions is grossly reducing any potential positive impacts 
it can have in the long term process of human capital accumulation. With respect to 
education, the lack of adequate infrastructure is the first warning sign of poor quality (p. 
61). Many schools lack basic infrastructure and resources, such as missing doors and 
windows, an insufficient amount of desks, no bathrooms and no running water (Campos, 
2008:64). There is a high rate of rotation of teachers in rural areas, and many of them do 
not have the proper degrees for a normalista, or student teacher. As well, many teachers 
look for options in urbanized schools as they have better resources and working 
conditions, this includes indigenous teachers and those from the communities that are 
covered by PROP (Campos, 2008:61-64).  
The states of Chihuahua and Sonora had the best education quality of the schools 
assessed, however they had a disproportionally small amount of PROP children. 
Conversely, Oaxaca and Chiapas had the poorest education quality and the highest 
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percentage of PROP students (Campos, 2008:61-62). Primary schools where more than 
70% of the students are from PROP were the ones with the lowest scores in Spanish and 
Math (Campos, 2008:63). The poor quality is because of the disproportional distribution 
of resources; schools located in the municipal capitals were allocated the majority of SEP 
resources, and schools with the no PROP students or with very few received the most 
money from other programs such as the Quality Schools Program (PEC). The National 
Reading Program distributed funds equally, while the Support for School Management 
favoured schools with high percentages of PROP students (Campos, 2008:63-64). As 
well, a study by Mancera et al had shown that this poor quality is reflected in the low 
impact PROP has had on the cognitive development of the children. They report that 55% 
of the beneficiaries that graduated junior high lack basic linguistic abilities and reading 
comprehension (Tetreault, 2012:65-66).  In other words, “the poorest attend the poorest 
schools” (Campos, 2008:63).  
Not only this, but various indigenous schools where a very high portion of the 
students live in extreme poverty are not covered by PROP. This is due to in part because 
they have no access to any nearby health facilities, and therefore are excluded from 
participation in the program (Campos, 2008:61-62).  
Health care provision has also been insufficient, despite increased usage. The 
average duration of a doctors’ placement was less than one year, and many had just 
finished their medical degree; the average was three years from the date of graduation. 
The inexperience of the medical professionals can be seen through the over-prescription 
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of antibiotics, 53% of children who did not need antibiotics were taking them (Campos, 
2008:41).  
The same SEDESOL evaluation showed how most facilities have a reduced 
capability to offer health services and lack many basic materials and medical tools (p. 38). 
Health centres did have electricity but many faced constant outages. As well, 30% of 
facilities did not have piped water and almost 50% had no sewage connection and 
therefore used septic tanks (p. 40). In addition, a high percentage of facilities evaluated 
did not have the necessary material to monitor aspects specifically related to the PROP 
program, such as prenatal care, anemia diagnostics, and diabetes screening (pp. 39-40). If 
advanced treatment was needed, the average distance between the local health facility and 
a more advanced one is 32 kilometers. In 70% of the cases where patients had to be 
moved, it was dependent on the patient and their family. Travel times averaged about one 
and a half hours and it incurred many extra costs (p. 38).  
 As mentioned in the previous section, CCTs have had a poor rate of participant 
insertion into the labour market. Despite the investments made in the PROP program, 
regional economic activity in areas where PROP is present have not grown or improved 
in any substantial manner; employment opportunities remain the same as they did in the 
past few years (Campos, 2008:80). This is largely a result of PROP not investing in any 
local infrastructure, which instead is dependent on other programs.  
  A survey conducted by ENCEL (Encuesta Evaluation de los Hogares, or 
Household Evaluation Survey) in 2007 revealed that the large majority of the 
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beneficiaries interviewed worked in some form of primary activity, the most common 
being agriculture. In the same survey, of the students aged 14-24 who had participated in 
PROP since 1998, 46.7% of them carried out some form of primary activity (Campos, 
2008:80). Employment and labour options were greater in the northern regions of 
Mexico, and a significant amount of internal migration was also reported. The migration 
was a response to the limited or non-existent labour opportunities in the beneficiaries’ 
locality, many ended up in much larger urban settings in search of work (Campos, 2008)., 
For those unable to migrate, Cindy Clavo (2011) states that the higher levels of education 
obtained by the beneficiaries were unnecessary to attain employment for the three 
principle options available (p. 67). As a result of the failures of market insertion and poor 
quality institutions, the potential positive benefits of PROP are significantly limited and 
beneficiaries are unable to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty.  
 This has become clear in a study conducted by Banegas and Mora in 2012. It 
examines the eligibility trajectories of PROP families over a ten year period. It is 
essentially showing the ‘success rate’ of the program, as families no longer become 
eligible for the transfer and ‘graduate’. The same families were observed three times over 
a ten year period in order to establish their eligibility for the program at the time of 








Trajectory of PROP Beneficiary Families 
Trajectory Frequency Percentage 
1.  Eligible  Eligible  Eligible 3,323 50.4% 
2.  Eligible  Eligible  Not Eligible 498 7.6% 
3.  Eligible  Not Eligible  Eligible 191 2.9% 
4.  Eligible  Not Eligible  Not Eligible 263 4.0% 
5.  Eligible  No Info  Eligible 947 14.4% 
Source: Adapted from Banega and Mora, 2012:46.  
 
The data presented demonstrates that over half of the families evaluated, after a 10 year 
period, were unable to graduate from the program and subsequently became ineligible for 
further benefits; they were still reliant upon the program for support. Some families had 
even graduated at one point in the program, only to fall once more into eligibility. This 
demonstrates the irregularities within the PROP program that are preventing families 
from escaping extreme poverty and graduating from the program.   
In the next section, I will be analyzing the data presented, beginning with 
Progresa-Oportunidades. I will then examine how the program has evolved in tandem 
with the macroeconomic policies. I will be arguing that the suite of policy regimes 
associated with neoliberal macroeconomic planning have adversely affected the 









Analysis and Discussion 
 
 With respect to the data presented, Progresa-Oportunidades has achieved strides 
towards reducing extreme poverty in Mexico; from 2010-2012 CONEVAL recorded a 
reduction of 1.5 million people. This shows that PROP is beginning to complete its task 
of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty, thus allowing families to improve their 
living conditions. However, the program has shown inconsistency in attaining its results. 
The figures presented by Banegas Gonzalez and Mora Sala (see Table 9) reveal that 
67.7% of the families were unable to escape extreme poverty and graduate from the 
program in a ten year period.  Some beneficiaries had even graduated at one point in the 
program, only to fall back into eligibility some three years later. Of the figures presented, 
only 11.6% of families were able to graduate from the program after the ten year period. 
These statistics show that there are limitations in breaking the intergenerational cycle of 
poverty. 
PROP suffers from this inconsistency due to a lack of policy integration and 
investment. It is a stand-alone program that is the only significant poverty reduction 
strategy used by the Mexican federal government. As previously seen, the administrations 
of both Fox and Calderon implemented wider poverty reduction frameworks that aimed to 
coordinate and integrate PROP with other public poverty alleviation programs. 
Unfortunately, CONTIGO and Vivir Mejor never realized their full potential as PROP 
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and FAIS consumed, on average, over half of their budgets. This meant that very few 
resources were allocated to other vital programs, such as employment schemes for PROP 
graduates, as well as other programs directed towards poverty alleviation for non-PROP 
beneficiaries.  
With regards to the budget of PROP, the time frame I will be focusing on is the 
2003-2008 period. This is due to the fact that in 2002 (for which budgetary information is 
unavailable), PROP expanded into urban centres containing less than one million 
inhabitants.  Later, in 2004, the extreme poor in metropolitan areas such as Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, and Monterrey, were included (Tetreault, 2012:64). Also, while the total 
PROP budget spiked from 2001-2003, it had stagnated during the years 2003-2008. 
PROP coverage grew by 800,000 families from 2003-2004 and total coverage remained 
at 5 million households through to 2008 (SEDESOL, 2012:24). It is important to examine 
how the government handled the rise in beneficiary families and utilized its services in a 
period of rapid expansion followed by relative stability. A table with the PROP budget 
and coverage is provided in Table 9 in the Appendix, as well as information about the 
Quality Schools Program (PEC) in relation to total PROP education in Table 10.  
Despite the large amount of resources allocated towards PROP in CONTIGO and 
Vivir Mejor, and the budget I had calculated in Table 7, total PROP expenditure does not 
include the complementary costs inherently associated with CCT programs. The 
education budget for the program consisted only of the scholarships provided to child 
beneficiaries. While this amount grew tremendously, from 5.5 billion pesos in 2001 to a 
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record 24.3 billion in 2011 (see Table 7), none of the money was directed towards 
infrastructure. Schools were forced to rely upon alternative sources of funding from the 
Secretary of Public Education (SEP). However, schools in the municipal capitals, and 
those with little or no PROP students, received a disproportionate amount of funding.  
One of the major contributors to infrastructure funding, the Quality Schools 
Program (PEC), saw almost no increase in its budget despite the growing number of 
children attending schools in poor areas. From 2001-2003, the budget exploded by 257% 
from 350 million to 1,250 million pesos. However, it stagnated from 2003-2008, growing 
by only 0.65%, while PROP scholarships grew by 58% (see Appendix, Table 10). This 
was due to the fact that during this period PROP had begun its expansion into semi-urban 
and urban areas, providing scholarships for those who had reached high school. This 
consequently meant that millions of children were attending more schools, while the 
institutions received almost no change in funding to keep up with the demand. As can be 
expected, PEC funding was thinly stretched and preference was given to the municipal 
capital schools since they traditionally have more students. Although municipal capital 
schools may have fewer PROP children, the funding provided had a bigger impact in 
terms of service population, thus increasing resource efficiency. Under these 
circumstances, isolated rural schools containing large PROP populations lacked adequate 
resources to provide the basic infrastructure such as desks, doors, windows, and 
bathrooms. This is consistent to what was published in the 2008 SEDESOL report, which 
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stated that the more isolated rural schools lacked sufficient funding to provide adequate 
infrastructure.  
 Just as the education budget lacked transparency in terms of fund allocation, so 
too did the health budget. Between 2003-2008, PROP increased its health care funding by 
44% (see Table 7). However, unlike education, it is unclear whether health centres in 
PROP areas received additional funding from other programs. If it did, than similar 
conclusions to those of education could be drawn. Namely, that the money was 
concentrated in the populous municipal capitals so as to achieve a bigger impact. 
 Unfortunately, investing limited funds into schools or health clinics that are 
located in isolated and marginalized areas with a small service population is not 
economically sound. This is especially true if there are already few resources available, as 
in the case of PEC. In order to achieve the biggest impact, it is better to invest in the 
schools and clinics that have greater service coverage. While other factors are certainly at 
play in the decision making of resource allocation, the scarcity of available funds has 
important role. This demonstrates how PROP is unable to make strides in poverty 
reduction because funding of its key institutions is not a priority. Consequently, the 
quality of the services provided thus reducing the potential to accumulate human capital. 
The issues PROP has with funding can be linked back to its lack of integration 
with other policies. The program was designed to rely upon its pre-existing infrastructure, 
and as such, very little has been done to expand upon these services. This is clear from 
the exclusion of localities that have neither schools nor health clinics. Building these 
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institutions would be incredibly expensive, as it would include not only building costs but 
also long term investments in staff and resource allocation. As PROP does not provide 
direct funding for infrastructures, resources from alternative, yet equally stretched 
programs would be required.  
The failure to integrate PROP with other social policies is also due to how the 
program defines poverty. The causes of poverty are understood as a lack of human capital 
resulting from a failure to use basic social services; a failure of uptake, not a failure of 
rights or of calibre. This notion is re-affirmed by the WB, who states that the lack of 
human capital is a direct result of parent’s poor investment in their children (Hanlon et al. 
2010). This interpretation is obvious when examining evaluations of the program; the 
statistics usually show the increase in service usage and not the possible limitations of 
poor quality. In addition, by conditioning the money, the ‘inadequate’ behaviour blamed 
for poor human capital accumulation is corrected. The interpretation of poverty 
subsequently aids in justifying the conditionality of the transfer, despite evidence that has 
emphasized the importance of income predictability rather than the conditions themselves 
(Slater, 2008).  
While it is important that the services be widely used, the calibre is what makes 
the impact in terms of human capital accumulation. PROP and other CCTs assume that 
higher education, coupled with an increased usage of health clinics, automatically 
translates into human capital formation. However, if the quality of the education and 
health care is poor, as we have seen in the previous section, then the participants do not 
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receive the maximum benefits. This was demonstrated by the Mancera study that showed 
how PROP children had lower cognitive development as a result of the poor quality 
education (Tetreault, 2012:65-66).  
It is this assumption that contributes to the limited impact PROP and other CCTs 
have on poverty reduction. Santiago Levy, the economist and architect behind PROP, 
outlined five main principles, one of which was to maintain fiscal balance by making the 
program as cost effective as possible (Tetreault, 2012). One way in which he achieved 
this was by relying upon the pre-existing institutions, thereby eliminating the need for 
PROP to invest in those areas. The PROP budget increases as school funding and health 
remains the same, despite the fact that more people are using the services. Unfortunately, 
the inability to coordinate between the basic social services that are fundamental to the 
success of the program and the CCT ultimately means that the service quality will be 
poor.  
However, despite these shortcomings, the design of PROP does conform to the 
neoliberal policy regime. This is because Levy created it around classical neoliberal 
economic principles. He created a program that focuses on demand-side, targeted 
interventions with the end goal of human capital accumulation for labour market insertion 
and social cohesion. It was an extension of the Salinas social liberalism paradigm: 
poverty reduction that does not interfere with the market and requires minimal state 
intervention while stimulating economic growth.  
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By examining PROP through the prism of demand, one can see that the 
organization has always been in the uptake of services. It is for this reason that the 
program is considered separate from other policies. The aim is for the people who already 
have access to basic social services to take advantage of them, not to expand access to 
those who do not have these institutions. As a result of this, the quality and infrastructure 
of schools and clinics are not a responsibility of PROP, as the question of supply is not 
factored into the program. As well, by not including the costs of the supply-side into the 
program, its budget as a percentage of GDP remains much smaller. Subsequently, this 
makes it more attractive to IFIs such as the World Bank and various development 
organizations who tout the minimal costs traditionally associated with these program. 
However, by not recognizing the codependency of the supply and demand, the quality of 
the institutions will suffer and the CCT will have minimal impact on human capital 
accumulation and poverty reduction.  
Targeted interventions also aid in keeping program costs to a minimum since 
coverage is limited. Social liberalism recognizes the importance of addressing extreme 
poverty, yet it does not interpret those living in moderate poverty or vulnerability as the 
ideal target population. This is because minimal social spending on the extreme poor has 
a greater effect; rather, it is spending less money while receiving higher returns. However 
the demographics of Mexico are changing and the overwhelming majority of those living 
below the national poverty line are in conditions of moderate poverty. While the struggles 
faced by the extreme poor are palpable and an important issue to address, focusing only 
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on 20% of the total indigent population can be seen as questionable. This is especially 
true when there are no real mechanisms in place to help those in moderate poverty. PROP 
is the main strategy of the government and as stated earlier, it consumes the better part of 
the total poverty reduction budget.  
Another issue with focused targeting is that the program is not a rights-based 
approach. Access to CCT programs is not a demandable right for the poor, and very little 
has been done by the federal government in enforcing and amplifying social rights. Fox 
did introduce the General Law of Social Development, however it did not establish new 
means for the poor and vulnerable populations to demand their social rights. By targeting 
only extremely impoverished groups via proxy-means testing and conditionality, the 
program is determining who can have access to the benefits of the program and 
consequently, education and health care. Those who do not qualify are subsequently 
excluded and are therefore unable to gain access to basic social services. This implies that 
services are not guaranteed for everyone, nor are they of the same quality. Since PROP is 
congruent with the neoliberal macroeconomic paradigm, it cannot become a rights-based 
program, as this would entail a universal approach rather than the targeted approach of 
separating the deserving from the non-deserving.  
PROP also focuses on the end goal of labour market insertion. This is in some 
ways the ‘pay-out’ the state receives from the program: a larger labour force that is better 
educated which spurs economic growth. It is believed that this process is what creates the 
upward spiral of economic growth which subsequently aids in poverty reduction, a notion 
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often cited by the Mexican elites. However, improved labour insertion is reliant upon the 
quality of the services used (for human capital accumulation) and the creation of jobs. If 
there are no jobs are available, or employment opportunities are created only in certain 
regions or in highly technical areas, then there is little impact on the options for the poor.  
PROP has faced issues with employment availability for its beneficiaries, as the 
projects in CONTIGO and Vivir Mejor focused mainly on temporary labour or 
microfinance schemes that received minimal funding. As well, the Mexican economy has 
suffered from unstable growth rates for the past three decades, punctuated by various 
financial crises. Subsequently, the economy has been unable to keep up with the rapidly 
growing labour force and labour informality has become prevalent. In addition, PROP is 
separate from regional economic growth and employment schemes which consequently 
poses the same problems as education and health. Other areas of social policy are not 
receiving the necessary funding either and it has become evident that more resources 
needed to make the program fully functional.  
All of the aforementioned issues are a result of the suite of neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies that were introduced by the Mexican government in the 1980s. 
Progresa-Oportunidades is neoliberal in nature because it was designed to fit within the 
wider policy regime. Santiago Levy created the program to accommodate for this 
macroeconomic approach, however in 2007 he stated that PROP will not reduce poverty 
as it is too narrowly focused and is not providing the necessary integration with 
employment creation schemes (p. 2). However, placing economics as the primary focus 
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for social policy design and decision making has become ingrained in the Mexican 
neoliberal paradigm. Consequently, poverty reduction strategies tend to be subordinate to 
the economic policies of the country. This is why the program is not addressing the 
limitations described by SEDESOL and CONEVAL evaluations, as well as the program’s 
designer.  
This has been demonstrated in Mexico on various occasions. During times of 
economic crisis, specifically in 1982 and 1994, social spending was reduced as a means to 
regain macroeconomic stability. However, it is during economic downturns that the 
population is more vulnerable and reliant upon existing safety net programs. If these 
programs are cut or are operating with reduced capacity, people will inevitably fall below 
the national poverty line. This correlation is clearly seen in Figure 2, with significant 
spikes in poverty in the year following economic crisis.  
 In addition, Vicente Fox passed a reform on Article 126 of the Mexican 
Constitution which established a balanced budget as a constitutional principle. While 
budget balancing and inflation control are incredibly important for an economy, they 
should not come at the expense of social wellbeing. Fortunately, this has been somewhat 
counteracted with the 2003 General Law of Social Development, which prevents major 
budget reductions to social spending during times of financial crisis. Although the 
legislature is somewhat vague in defining what constitutes social development, it played a 
role in reducing the amount of people that were pushed into poverty as a result of the 
2008 recession. Overall, poverty levels increased by only a small percentage, and in 2009 
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the PROP budget jumped to 0.36% of GDP compared to 0.26 and 0.25 per cent of GDP in 
2008 and 2007 respectively (see Figure 3 and Table 7).  
 Comparing the results of the 1994/95 and 2008/09 economic crisis reveals the 
importance of the Social Development law. Both recessions had similar characteristics, 
whereby GDP fell below -4% followed by positive growth of 5% in the following year 
(1996 and 2010, see Figure 2). However, poverty levels soared by almost 20% between 
the 1994-1996 period, while levels increased by less than 5 percentage points in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Much can be said about the differences in response by 
Zedillo and Calderon, but the role of the Social Development law cannot be ignored. This 
is a positive example for other developing nations demonstrating the crucial impact social 
spending can have on the containment of poverty in times of crisis. 
 The case of Mexico presents valuable information and lessons that can be applied 
to other Latin American countries with CCT programs. The biggest limitation that PROP 
faces is the lack of policy integration. It is the most extensive poverty reduction scheme 
that the Mexican federal government has implemented but it is understood as a separate 
entity from all other social policies. Resources to improve service quality and basic 
infrastructure are not included as an aim of the program, nor is the creation of 
employment opportunities. However, PROP is entirely reliant upon the calibre of these 
very institutions in order to achieve its long-term goal of breaking the intergenerational 
cycle of poverty.  
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 The disconnect between PROP and other policies is a result of its neoliberal 
nature. In order to reduce costs, it focuses on areas that have the necessary infrastructure, 
and the transfers are provided only to a select number of families. Emphasis is placed on 
labour market insertion, but there is no real strategy in motion for promoting the growth 
of the economy in rural areas or providing long-term employment. Doing so would create 
possible distortions in the market which PROP was designed to avoid. Instead, the federal 
government has been relying upon the market to fix itself. Unfortunately, Mexico has 
suffered from various devastating recessions which have severely damaged the economy. 
This damage has stagnated the growth of the formal labour market which in turn has not 
been able to keep up with the rapid expansion of labour demand. Thus, PROP 
beneficiaries are unable to find long-term employment that is a key element in breaking 
the intergenerational cycle of poverty.  
 This has also been the case in Brazil and Chile. Bolsa Familia beneficiaries did 
not keep their employment for longer than eleven months, and those in Chile Solidario 
could not find stable, long-term employment. These issues reflect the disengagement that 
CCTs have with other social policies. This disengagement is a result of the neoliberal 
nature by focusing on cost effectiveness. Programs focus only on demand while supply, 
despite being the most critical part of program operation, is excluded and infrequently 
mentioned. This leads many to believe that simply providing cash to the families is 
sufficient to increase their human capital and break the intergenerational cycle of poverty 
by “[…] pull[ing] themselves up by their bootstraps” (Hanlon et al. 2010:173). 
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There are, however, consequences to the promotion of poverty as simply a lack of 
cash. Consequently, CCTs do not confront some of the most important structural issues 
behind poverty, such as lacking rights and entitlements, as well as the inherent 
inequalities that exist within a market based system. On the contrary, CCTs benefit this 
system by providing a poverty reduction strategy that is demand-side and market 
orientated. For these reasons Latin American scholars such as Boltvinik, Medrano, Barba, 
Puello-Socorras and Gunturiz interpret CCTs as a continuation of neoliberal policies and 
therefore a superficial answer to poverty reduction.   
 CCTs are not effective in the long-term reduction of poverty as they lack the 
necessary integration with other social and economic policies. Since the rise of 
neoliberalism in Latin America during the 1980s, this policy regime has consolidated 
itself throughout the continent. Under these circumstances, economics takes precedence 
in social policy decision making, thus shifting development strategies towards market-
orientated, demand side interventions. CCTs were designed around these macroeconomic 
policies and it is because of this design flaw that the programs are limited in their 
effectiveness.  
Cost effectiveness is one of the biggest factors in the design of cash transfer 
programs, and as such, targeting has been limited to a small percentage of the poor 
population. Extra programming and support systems must be established to address the 
large number of people living in conditions of moderate poverty, otherwise long term 
sustainable poverty reduction cannot take place. As well, by viewing the problem as a 
74 
 
demand-side issue, investment has not increased in the pre-existing institutions that the 
program is vitally dependent upon. It is for these reasons that PROP and other CCTs have 
been unable to reduce extreme poverty in any sustainable manner.  
 The importance of basic social services in CCTs is evident. Improved health status 
and education are cited as the main driver for future economic growth. Access to these 
services, however, should not be dependent upon location, income, or the compliance of 
co-responsibilities. All poor and vulnerable populations are deserving of these services, 
and it is vital that social policy is no longer viewed solely through the prism of 
macroeconomic policy. This would, however, require a departure from the traditional 
neoliberal paradigm.  
 It is evident that examining the conditional cash transfer program Progresa-
Oportunidades that is has been shaped and influenced by the neoliberal macroeconomic 
policies. Subsequently, the market continues to play an important role in the reduction of 
poverty. The promotion of cost efficiency as well as congruency with structural reforms 
remains critical in the design of PROP. This has consequently resulted in the limited 
investment in basic social services contributing to the neglect of rural institutions. By not 
growing the funding for these facilities in tandem with program expansion, education and 
health centres have suffered from chronic poor quality and neglect resulting from a 
sudden surge in usage. The programs blindness towards the inherent interdependency 
with other sectors such as health, education, and employment creation, has thusly 




Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 The suite of policy regimes associated with neoliberal macroeconomic planning 
have adversely affected the objectives, implementation, and outcomes of the conditional 
cash transfer program Progresa-Oportunidades. PROP has been impacted in three ways: 
Firstly, the program conforms to the neoliberal policy regime because it was designed 
using classical neoliberal economic theory, thus accommodating the suite of 
macroeconomic policies implemented since the 1980s; Secondly, the understanding of 
poverty pushes for a demand-side, market orientated strategy that interprets poverty as a 
monetary issue; Thirdly, this perception has resulted in a lack of policy integration and 
investment. Combined, these three factors have limited the ability of PROP to break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty.   
 The architect of Progresa-Oportunidades was economist Santiago Levy, who 
designed the program using classical neoliberal economic principles. By constructing a 
program to be congruent with neoliberal macroeconomic policies, the market is placed 
first when designing social programs. This is demonstrated via three principles outlined: 
congruency with structural reforms and avoiding distortion in the market; delivering 
support in a cost effective manner; and targeting only those living in extreme poverty. 
These principles have shaped how poverty is understood in almost all CCT programs. 
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 In PROP, poverty is a result of inadequate insertion into the labour market 
stemming from a lack of human capital. This results in lower wages and subsequently 
impoverishment. The intergenerational cycle is caused by insufficient cash that does not 
allow families to invest in human capital. Thus, poverty is a result of monetary problems 
that prevent them from taking advantage of basic social services. It is not a result of 
lacking social rights, nor is it the failure of inferior quality institutions. Therefore, the 
solution resides in the provision of cash and uptake of basic social services. This is the 
demand-orientated inference of PROP and other CCTs: increased school attendance and 
health check-ups automatically translate into improved human capital.   
 This assumption leads to the isolation of CCTs from other social policy initiatives 
and investments. Firstly, PROP is the only extensive poverty reduction program currently 
used in Mexico. As such, it dominates the total poverty reduction budget and is the main 
focus of social policy. As a result, little money is left over to dedicate to other poverty 
reduction strategies and social programs, such as the creation of employment 
opportunities for the poor. These programs are necessary for the improved integration of 
resources available to the poor once they have graduated from PROP.  
However, the program relies upon pre-existing infrastructure, and since it focuses 
on demand, the expansion and improvement of these facilities is not one of its concerns. 
This has resulted in insufficient funding to vital sectors that are unable to keep up with the 
sudden surge in demand. Consequently, the quality of education and health service 
provision has suffered, as scant resources must be distributed among more facilities. 
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These extra costs are not included in the budget of PROP, even though the success of the 
program relies directly upon these institutions.  
By targeting only the extreme poor and consuming the majority of the poverty 
reduction budget, PROP has both directly and indirectly excluded the majority of the 
indigent population. Those living in moderate poverty, vulnerability, and even some who 
live in extreme poverty are unable to gain access to the program benefits. The targeting 
selection of PROP reflects the program’s neoliberal origins. By only focusing on extreme 
poverty, the allocated funds have a larger impact on poverty reduction than it would with 
moderate and vulnerable groups. Consequently, there are few resources available for 
social programming despite PROP covering only a fraction of the indigent population. As 
a result, overall poverty throughout Mexico has continued to increase due to the lack of 
allocated funds to address moderate poverty and vulnerability.     
It is therefore evident that Progresa-Oportunidades will not succeed in breaking 
the intergenerational cycle of poverty in the current suite of neoliberal policies. Although 
it was specifically designed to accommodate these principles, they have negatively 
affected the potential impact PROP could have on long-term poverty reduction. If PROP 
is not modified and services expanded to accommodate all who live under the national 
poverty line, then it will continue to contain the growth of extreme poverty since it has 
been unable to make any significant advances in reduction. Meanwhile, moderate poverty 
will continue to grow as there are no mechanisms in place to combat it.  
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Analyzing a conditional cash transfer in context of macroeconomic policy is 
necessary in understanding how the program is shaped and influenced. Major social 
programs are designed to accommodate the reigning macroeconomic paradigm and 
subsequently take on characteristics attributed to this outlook. In the case of PROP, it was 
an extension of social liberalism. It was centred on the market and did not question the 
role economic growth plays in poverty reduction. As such, the components of the 
program aim to contribute ultimately to the expansion and growth of the market. 
However, it is this outlook that has limited the contribution that PROP could have on 
poverty reduction.  
My policy recommendations would be to construct a succinct interdependent 
approach to the program, beginning with an increase to the funding for programs which 
provide infrastructure investment to education and health facilities, like the Quality 
Schools Program. An in-depth examination of the quality of the education and health care 
provided is also necessary in order to understand the primary struggles faced by these 
facilities, as well as determining which institutions are chronically underfunded and 
understaffed. A survey of the areas excluded by PROP is also required in order to identify 
these communities as marginalized, and through the recognition of their social rights, 
provide them with basic social services. 
While constructing schools and health clinics in every locality throughout the 
country is not feasible, there are alternative solutions. One such solution would be the 
usage of mobile clinics. These could provide basic health care to the isolated communities 
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which are too far away from larger health-care facilities. These mobile clinics would also 
be able to distribute nutritional supplements, basic first aid kits and additional medical 
supplies that would last until the next mobile clinic visited. The periodicity of these visits 
could be a two week placement once every four months. This time-frame would permit 
regular check-ups for the beneficiaries, and especially for the pregnant women. 
Progresa-Oportunidades must also have an integrated policy package that places 
equal emphasis on providing quality education and health services, as well as generating 
employment opportunities for graduates. This is crucial if the program wishes to be 
successful in breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty. The basic framework is 
already in place for many support programs, but there must be greater political will 
backed by tangible resources in order for these policy packages to work. These changes 
should be well received, as they would benefit not only those in PROP but other members 
of the communities as well. 
Progresa-Oportunidades must also expand to cover those living in conditions of 
moderate poverty, or a separate, comprehensive strategy must be designed to provide 
some type of support mechanism to this group. If it is to expand, than the size of the 
transfer will have to be reduced in order to provide relief to all beneficiaries. In order to 
compensate, participants should be allowed to buy subsidized food. In order to control 
distribution, beneficiaries can be provided an identification card which states the number 
of family members in order to buy certain quantities of food. This process should be 
relatively simply as families are registered in the program with this information.  
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Another way to re-distribute funds would be to start the education scholarship in 
Grade 6 instead of Grade 3. This is because primary education base enrollment levels 
were already over 90% before PROP, so there is no need to award scholarships as a form 
of parental enticement for keeping their young children in primary school. Grade 6 has 
been proved as the critical point for children dropping out, and the scholarship has led to 
massive increase in the transition from primary to secondary school. The savings 
generated by eliminating those scholarships could be directed towards families living in 
moderate poverty.  
Once the program has expanded and employment options are available for the 
beneficiaries, it can being to shift from a conditional cash transfer to a universal style 
program. This would be a rights based approach to tackling poverty since all Mexicans 
are recognized as having the right to education and health care, regardless of location or 
condition compliance.  As well, if the required facilities are in place and operational, and 
families have a stable source of income, than the uptake will not rely upon the transfer.  
The social wellbeing of Mexicans can no longer be second to macroeconomic 
policies. As Valencia (2008) stated, the debate must not be limited to neoliberal or 
universal style policies. Rather, CCTs require state involvement and the recognition of the 
interdependency that exists between the program and other sectors. As they are currently 
implemented, CCTs serve to contain the rapid growth of poverty rather than eliminating 
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PROP Budget in Pesos and as % GDP vs. Coverage 2001-2012 
YEAR BUDGET TOTAL 
(PESOS) 
PROP % GDP PROP COVERAGE 
2001 13,002,297,202 0.138011836 3,100,000 
2003 21,295,914,711 0.229662615 4,200,000 
2004 25,825,073,467 0.257903117 4,200,000 
2005 29,781,843,156 0.264433579 5,000,000 
2006 31,559,728,787 0.251120431 5,000,000 
2007 34,788,929,484 0.256477331 5,000,000 
2008 37,211,065,570 0.26043669 5,000,000 
2009 46,062,853,304 0.395760571 5,200,000 
2010 62,060,871,315 0.453954574 5,800,000 
2011 64,836,970,953 0.426247403 5,800,000 
2012 63,014,108,085 0.408546048 5,800,000 
Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Presupuesto de Egresos. Ramos 11, 12, and 
20. Análisis Funcional Programático Económico (AFPE or AP). 
http://www.shcp.gob.mx/EGRESOS/PEF/Paginas/PresupuestodeEgresos.aspx and SEDESOL, 



















Education vs Quality Schools Program (PEC) budget 2001-2012 
YEAR EDUCATION PEC 
2001 5,584,800,000 350,000,000 
2003 10,999,518,895 1,250,000,000 
2004 11,987,819,376 1,258,568,128 
2005 15,468,435,596 1,247,538,843 
2006 16,550,000,000 1,258,568,128 
2007 16,550,000,000 1,258,071,379 
2008 17,350,000,000 1,258,200,000 
2009 18,182,800,000 1,499,827,896 
2010 22,860,520,104 1,477,418,501 
2011 24,358,293,857 1,920,895,646 
2012 22,758,293,857 1,700,000,000 
Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Presupuesto de Egresos. Ramos 11, 12, and 
20. Análisis Funcional Programático Económico (AFPE or AP). 
http://www.shcp.gob.mx/EGRESOS/PEF/Paginas/PresupuestodeEgresos.aspx. Elaborated by the 
author.   
 
 
 
 
 
